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Impacts of extreme weather events are relevant for regional (in the sense of subnational) economies and
in particular cities in many aspects. Cities are the cores of economic activity and the amount of people
and assets endangered by extreme weather events is large, even under the current climate. A changing
climate with changing extreme weather patterns and the process of urbanization will make the whole
issue even more relevant in the future. In this paper, deﬁnitions and terminology in the ﬁeld of extreme
weather events are discussed. Possible regional impacts of extreme weather events are collected, fo-
cusing on European cities. The human contributions to those impacts are emphasized. Furthermore,
methodological aspects of economic impact assessment are discussed along a temporal and a sectoral
dimension. Finally, common economic impact models are compared, analyzing their strengths and
weaknesses.
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Extreme weather events have always had and will continue to
have signiﬁcant consequences for the society and the economy.
Climate projections tell us that changing extreme weather pat-
terns are very likely to increase the exposure to those events.
Agglomerations face a special challenge because more and more
people and value creation is concentrating there, resulting in a
higher vulnerability of society to extreme weather.
Vulnerability is a key concept when assessing possible impacts
to a system. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(2001) deﬁnes vulnerability (to climate change) as’‘the degree to
which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse
effects of climate change, including climate variability and ex-
tremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and
rate of climate variation to which a system is exposed, its sensi-
tivity, and its adaptive capacity.’ Without going into detail, it can
be seen that vulnerability always has to be speciﬁed by answering
which system is vulnerable to which type of hazard.
There are different concepts of vulnerability and even IPCC
deﬁnitions of vulnerability have not always been consistent
(Brooks, 2003). One main issue seems to be whether the likelihood
that a certain system is impacted by a hazard should be included
in the vulnerability concept or if vulnerability should only be de-
termined be inherent properties of the system. Brooks (2003)
suggests to use the term’‘biophysical vulnerability’ when the
likelihood of a hazard is included and’‘social vulnerability’ or’‘-
inherent vulnerability’ when not. In the context of extreme
weather events, the likelihood of impacts is also related to in-
herent properties of the system, e.g., because of the anthropogenic
contribution to climate change. Therefore, it makes sense to use
the broader concept of biophysical vulnerability. In Fig. 1, the
connection between different terms explaining vulnerability is
illustrated.
The ﬁgure shows that socio-economic factors are the mainFig. 1. Concept of vulnerability (to extreme weather). Socio-economic factors are
important drivers of vulnerability.
Source: own representation.determinants of vulnerability.
The exposure to extreme weather events is inﬂuenced by cli-
matic conditions, which again can be inﬂuenced by socio-eco-
nomic factors like the anthropogenic climate change. Sensitivity
means how dramatic the impacts of an extreme weather event
will affect the system. Together with the exposure, sensitivity
constitutes susceptibility. Adaptive capacity plays a more im-
portant role, e.g., when assessing social impacts of extreme
weather events. Whereas the susceptibility to ﬂoods could be the
same for all people living in a certain neighborhood, people with
higher income might be seen as less vulnerable due to a higher
(monetary) adaptive capacity. However, it is not consensual
whether the adaptive capacity should be included in the vulner-
ability concept. This is because adaptive capacity does not have to
be’‘self-realizing’ (Brooks, 2003) and therefore might inﬂuence the
actual vulnerability only theoretically.
Another term that is often used in the context of climate
change and especially extreme weather events is risk. Risk is
usually deﬁned as the’‘combination of the probability [of occur-
rence] of a certain event and its negative consequences’ (United
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2009). The
probability of occurrence of many types of extreme weather
events is believed to be affected, most likely increased by climate
change. The other part of the deﬁnition, the amount of negative
consequences, i.e., losses for a speciﬁc event can be worsened also
by other human contributions like higher asset values in en-
dangered areas or a more complex economy and society in
general.
It is interesting to embed the term’‘risk’ into the concept of
vulnerability. Brooks (2003) states that the term risk in its usual
deﬁnition (as above) is broadly equivalent to the biophysical vul-
nerability. There are many indications that over the last decades
the risk of extreme weather events has increased.
As an example, Fig. 2 illustrates the estimated costs of extreme
weather events in the US between 1980 and 2012. The ﬁtted
quadratic trend suggests that the amount of losses and therefore
the risk (probability and/or negative consequence) has increased.
Considering the proposed equivalence of risk and vulnerability, it
would be equivalent to say that the vulnerability to extreme
weather events has increased in the US over the last decades.
So far, the terms damages, costs and losses have been used in a
rather general meaning. However, for the economic analysis of
impacts of extreme weather events they have to be further spe-
ciﬁed. In the economic literature, a common distinction is that
between’‘damages’ as direct physical destruction of means of
production and’‘losses’ as the lost proceeds in the affected com-
pany/sector due to the damages (Okuyama, 2003).
Finally,’‘indirect losses’ are deﬁned as the losses that other
agents in the economy have, e.g., because they are not supplied by
the damaged company/sector.
Later in this paper, the concept above is used along two di-
mensions. A sectoral dimension, which is already implicitly pre-
sent in the concept and a temporal dimension since’‘losses’ as a
ﬂow measure are connected to time by deﬁnition. Especially re-
garding the combined regional and sectoral dimension of impacts
of extreme weather events, there seems to be need for further
research and this paper tries to make a contribution. Let it be
noted here that the term’regional’ will always refer to the subna-
tional scale from now on.
Since extreme weather events are often seen as’‘natural
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Fig. 2. Estimated costs of extreme weather events in the US from 1980 to 2012 in billion USD (value of 2013). Combined costs of all types of weather events are shown, but
only extreme events with costs of more than 1 billion USD are included.
Source: own representation, data obtained from National Climatic Data Center, 2013
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human behavior is an important driver regarding their impacts
and losses. In Cavallo and Noy (2010) a quote referring to Sen
(1981) can be found which illustrates the issue by the example of
famines which frequently occur as the consequence of extreme
weather in the form of drought. “Starvation is the characteristic of
some people not having enough food to eat. It is not the char-
acteristic of there being not enough food to eat.” This underlines
that what might be perceived as impacts of’‘natural’ extreme
weather events like droughts can be at least partly seen as man-
made. In any case, whether caused by natural or man-made pro-
cesses, coping with increasing losses from extreme weather be-
comes more and more important for countries and cities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next
section, concepts of extremity are discussed and an overview
about types of extreme weather events and their possible impacts
is given, focusing on cities. Human contributions that might be
responsible for worsening the impacts are also mentioned. In
Section 3, impacts of extreme weather events are structured and
discussed methodologically. Section 4 deals with impact models
and their ability to capture different impact dimensions. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.2. Terminology and types of extreme weather
The ﬁrst part in this section is concerned with deﬁnitions that
were not yet clearly discussed in the introduction. It is not obvious
or self-evident what the term’‘extreme’ shall really mean in the
context of weather events. First, one can distinguish between oc-
currence extremity and impact extremity. Occurrence extremity is
based on values of meteorological variables1 that describe the
weather event as such and impact extremity is based on measur-
ing the magnitude of certain impacts of the event, inter-
preting’‘extreme’ in the sense of severe consequences. For both
dimensions, a further distinction can be made between absolute
extremity and rarity. Stephenson (2008) presents a very detailed
discussion of the topic, whereas in this paper, the matter is dealt1 Usually, different variables can be chosen for the analysis. For example, in-
tensity, duration and domain are common meteorological variables that describe
an extreme weather event.with in a compact way.
Absolute extremity means that an event is considered to be
extreme if a certain characteristic number exceeds/deceeds a
predeﬁned absolute threshold. This concept is implicitly used if,
e.g., statements like’‘extremes will become the norm’ are made
(cf. Stephenson, 2008) because in order to make sense the state-
ment requires that the deﬁnition of extreme is independent of
observed/projected values which determine the norm. Following
this concept, a rain event could be considered extreme if the
amount of rainfall on one day exceeds, e.g., 25 l per m2.
Note that in Fig. 2, extreme events are analyzed along the im-
pact dimension, since not the meteorological properties but the
monetary losses are assessed and the concept used is that of ab-
solute extremity, since all events with estimated losses of less than
the ﬁxed threshold of 1 billion USD are excluded.
The opposing concept would be the’‘rarity’ or relative ex-
tremity. It is derived from the (empirical) distribution of the ob-
served data about the corresponding event and it is frequently
expressed in terms of the return period. The latter is deﬁned as the
reciprocal of the complementary distribution function2. In contrast
to an absolute threshold, a threshold quantile is deﬁned as the
bound of normality. Using again the rain example, a rain event
could be considered rare or relatively extreme if the amount of
rain lies outside the empirical 99.9%-quantile of the distribution of
daily rainfall, or – in other words – if it has an estimated return
probability of 1000 days. Within this concept of extremity, stating
that extremes will become the norm is impossible, since the de-
ﬁnition of extreme is made relative to the (possibly changing)
average/norm.
The difference between the two concepts becomes most ap-
parent when two distributions are compared, for example present
and future distributions. Fig. 3 illustrates how climate change is
projected to change the occurrence probabilities of extremes, here
summer temperatures.
From observation (period 1961–1990), a threshold for an ex-
tremely warm summer could be set to 18 °C. Using that same
measure of extremity for a different situation, namely the climate
scenario for the period 2071–2100, nearly all summers would have
to be called extremely hot. This might be true in an absolute way,2 The complementary distribution function is also called survival function.
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the climate of the period in which they occur by using the concept
of rarity or relative extremity. In this case, a summer in the period
2071–2100 would probably not be called extremely hot until its
mean temperature reaches 24 °C. The red line indicates the mean
summer temperature in the summer of 2003. The historical dis-
tribution cannot explain this anomaly and it is very plausible that
the parameters of the distribution have changed already.
Another discussion is that concerning extremity in the sense of
variability. This interpretation aims at characterizing the whole
distribution instead of classifying a single event as extreme or not
extreme. From a statistical point of view, a distribution is extreme
if the observed values vary a lot, that is if the standard deviation is
high. When two distributions are compared, the variability is
useful since it combines information about the distribution in a
single number, the standard deviation. When comparing two
distributions with the concept of absolute extremity, statements
about changes in the extremity can generally only be made with
respect to a speciﬁc threshold value. A distribution could be called
absolutely more extreme (for high extremes) if the likelihood of
excess increases for high threshold values. Within the concept of
relative extremity, statements about its changes depend on the
choice of the quantile. As a measure for the relative extremity of a
distribution one could use the distance of the quantiles to the
median. A distribution is relatively more extreme (for high ex-
tremes) than another when the distance of the upper quantiles to
the median increases. In Fig. 4, three situations of more extreme
temperatures are sketched. For the explanation it shall be noted
that the focus is on the high extremes.
The ﬁrst graph (a) corresponds to an increase of absolute ex-
tremity, since for predeﬁned thresholds of high temperatures, the
likelihood of excess increases. The relative extremity or rarity stays
the same because the distance of all quantiles to the median re-
mains the same. The variability does not change either because it
does not depend on the location of the distribution. The
subﬁgure (b) corresponds to an increase in variability, which im-
plies also an increase in absolute and relative extremity for high
temperatures. This is because for high threshold temperatures, the
likelihood of excess increases (absolute extremity) and also the
distances of the upper quantiles to the median increase (relative
extremity). The bottom graph (c) corresponds to the general
ﬁndings of, e.g., Hansen et al. (2012) for the projected distribution
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of extremity. The increase in mean and variability imply an in-
crease in absolute and relative extremity for high temperatures.
To sum up, one can say that although the deﬁnition of’‘extreme’
is either clear or not so important in most cases, one should have
in mind that if one stumbles across statements like’‘the tempera-
tures will be more extreme’ this can just mean warmer/colder or it
can mean more variable-or both.
2.1. Impacts of speciﬁc extreme weather events
Let us now come to the impacts of different types of extreme
weather events relevant on a regional European scale and espe-
cially for cities. Five types of events are identiﬁed. These ﬁve types
are based on the European Environment Agency (2012a) deﬁnition
which considers the ﬁrst three (ﬂood, drought, heat) in detail and
two more types are added (cold/snow, storm).
In order to further analyze the impacts, some kind of categor-
ization has to be used. In this paper, impacts are categorized along
two dimensions, a sectoral and a temporal dimension. For the
sectoral dimension it makes sense that (a) the considered sectors
together constitute the whole society/economy and (b) the sectors
are pooled in a meaningful manner. Therefore, the deﬁnitions of
sectors from input–output tables or social accounting matrices
seem very useful since they fulﬁll both of the above properties
(cf. Rose, 2004). Again, the degree of detail is somewhat arbitrary.
Here, the sectors agriculture, industry/business, tourism, trans-
port, insurance, housing and health are used and ecosystems are
included as an additional’‘non-market’ sector. The choice of sectors
is discussed in Section 3.4. Regarding the temporal dimension, it is
distinguished between short-term and long-term impacts. How-
ever, in this section, impacts of each type of extreme weather are
collected in a general manner. The temporal issues are again
picked up in Section 3.3.
As already mentioned in the introduction, impacts of natural
disasters do not only depend on natural processes but also on
human behavior. Therefore, possible human contribution to the
vulnerability to different types of extreme weather events de-
scribed above is also discussed. Adaptation measures to extreme
weather events are not treated in this paper, but the correspond-
ing considerations can also give some indications how cities can
reduce their vulnerability by changing economic and social pro-
cesses. Reducing the vulnerability to extreme weather events has
two dimensions in practice. On the one hand, crisis management is
needed during the actual event. On the other hand, risk manage-
ment is, i.a., needed to develop a (long-term) adaptation strategy.
2.2. Floods
Floods in Europe belong to the costliest extreme weather
events. Loss estimates for the ﬂood events in Central Europe in
May/June 2013 range around damages of 12 billion EUR (Mu-
nichRe, 2013b). The EEA distinguishes different ﬂood types (plu-
vial, coastal, ﬂash, groundwater, etc.) mentioning the different
causes and also the different time scales (European Environment
Agency, 2012a).
From the literature about potential ﬂood losses in cities by the
example of simulated ﬂood events in the city of Hamburg (Ko-
walewski and Ujeyl, 2012), it is known that damages to buildings
(industry and housing) and machinery are likely to add up to a big
part of ﬂood damages in European cities. Fatalities in European
cities due to ﬂoods are tragic, but usually and fortunately not so
numerous to be economically relevant. Destruction of infra-
structure is relevant, especially in the context of indirect losses
which will be discussed later.2.3. Human contribution to ﬂoods
The vulnerability to ﬂood events, including coastal, river and
ﬂash ﬂoods is strongly inﬂuenced by human behavior. In European
cities, the common high degree of surface sealing (EEA (European
Environment Agency, 2012)) prevents water from trickling and
increases the discharge ﬂow. Sewage systems of insufﬁcient ca-
pacity might not be able to take the water that ﬂows in from the
growing impervious area that is connected to it. Furthermore,
forcing rivers into narrow river beds can worsen ﬂoods because of
increased runoff speed and higher pressure on protective em-
bankments. For example, Christiansen (2004) states that from
1850 until 2002 the area of natural ﬂood plains of the river Elbe
had been reduced by 86%.
2.4. Droughts
Droughts are the consequence of little or no precipitation over
a longer period of time. According to the European Commission,
droughts have dramatically increased in number and intensity in
the EU over the last decades. The number of areas and people
affected by droughts went up by almost 20% between 1976 and
2006 (European Commission , 2012).
The effects of the lack of water for watering (mainly agri-
culture), business activity (e.g. food industries) and cooling
(especially power plants) are believed to be the most relevant.
Droughts can also contribute to (forest) ﬁres possibly resulting in
destruction of buildings and other assets. Nevertheless, the oc-
currence of ﬁres also depends on other factors like wind, etc. Re-
garding health, fatalities as direct consequences of drought have
not been reported (European Environment Agency, 2012a), but the
water quality can be negatively inﬂuenced since a reduced ﬂow in
water pipes can increase the pollution with germs. Many climate
projections as presented in the EEA report (European Environment
Agency, 2012a) suggest that, in the future, there will be less pre-
cipitation during the summer, especially in the Mediterranean part
of Europe. Expected higher temperatures in the summer and re-
sulting evaporation contribute to the problem.
2.5. Human contribution to droughts
Whereas droughts are speciﬁc climatological/weather events,
water scarcity is usually used to describe the general problem of
supplying the society/economy with enough water. However,
general water scarcity can of course aggravate droughts. The main
human drivers of water scarcity are increased consumption (not
only of water directly), population growth (urbanization) and
agriculture (European Environment Agency, 2012a). Deforestation
and ineffective water recycling contribute to the problem. In ad-
dition, the (local) water markets do not always function well. The
absence of (informative) price signals can lead to mismanagement
of water resources. Our energy system contributes to the problem
of water scarcity and droughts, since in Europe as a whole, 45% of
the freshwater demand comes from that sector (European En-
vironment Agency, 2010). This is mainly due to the use of thermal
power plants which require large amounts of cooling water (cf.
Torcellini et al., 2003 for the US).
2.6. Heat waves
Heat waves in Europe are the type of extreme weather with the
biggest impact on human health. The major heat wave of 2003 is
believed to be responsible for tens of thousands of additional
deaths.
Studies suggest that high temperatures reduce the productivity
of workers signiﬁcantly (Sepännen et al., 2006). The economic
3 Although not visible in the ﬁgure, in the record year of 2005 (among other
years), the major part of the losses was caused by hurricanes.
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amplify heat waves in cities. Burst and buckled streets as well as
low water levels in rivers are likely impacts in the trafﬁc system. In
general, heat events and droughts are often connected and certain
impacts like wildﬁres and crop shortfall are the result of the
combination of heat and drought. According to the literature
(Hansen et al., 2012), global warming will lead to a shift in the
probability distribution not only resulting in higher mean tem-
peratures but especially in an increase in the number of heat
anomalies (relative to the mean).
2.7. Human contribution to heat waves
The fact that cities and city planning can contribute to heat
stress in urban areas has been more and more recognized. The
‘heat island’ effect is mentioned frequently in the literature (e.g.
European Environment Agency, 2012a). Artiﬁcial surfaces, less
green areas and lack of fresh air passages are some factors ag-
gravating urban heat problems. Furthermore, energy use in cities
for various reasons (transport, business, cooling etc.) leads to ad-
ditional heat production.
2.8. Cold waves
Cold waves frequently hit Europe, especially the continental
Eastern part. Cold-related deaths in whole Europe added up to 824
in a 2012 cold wave (Aon Benﬁeld, 2012).
Apart from health impacts, damages to the trafﬁc and energy
system are believed to be the most relevant economic impacts. For
the future, climate projections assume that winter precipitation,
but also winter temperatures will increase in Northern Europe and
the snow season is very likely to shorten in all of Europe (Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007). However, there is
still some uncertainty regarding speciﬁc extreme events like cold
waves.
2.9. Human contribution to cold waves
The positive human contributions to the impacts of cold waves
most likely outweigh the negative contributions. Urban energy
production and resulting thermal discharge reduces the cold stress
for people and the amount of snow in the city.
2.10. Storms
From the meteorological point of view, storms are low-pressure
areas. In this paper, the term’‘storm’ is used in the narrower sense
for heavy winds, hail and lightning. Heavy rain and/or storm sur-
ges also frequently go along with storms but that is dealt with
under the topic ﬂoods.
The most severe storm in Europe in recent years was the extra
tropical cyclone’‘Kyrill’ in 2007. 49 people were reported dead and
the total damages were estimated to be USD 10 billion by Mu-
nichRe (2013a).
Compared to other events, storms are relatively well covered by
insurance. For the storm’‘Kyrill’ it was estimated that 58% of the
damages were insured (MunichRe, 2013a). Regarding future in-
ﬂuence of climate change, the fourth IPCC report (Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change, 2007) states that the’‘conﬁdence
in future changes in windiness is relatively low, but it seems more
likely than not that there will be an increase in average and ex-
treme wind speeds in northern Europe.’ Other sources (European
Environment Agency, 2012a) provide explicit numbers supporting
the above statements.2.11. Human contribution to storms
The (anthropogenic) climate change is believed to rather in-
crease the occurrence of storms. Unfortunately, the precise ex-
pected future development is still uncertain (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, 2007), although storms are responsible
for a big part of the losses from extreme weather (for the US, see
Fig. 2,3).3. Classiﬁcation of economic impacts
In this section, the impacts described in Section 2 are struc-
tured and different structuring methodologies are compared. So
far, the term’‘impact’ was used in a general way referring to all
economic and non-economic effects. For the further analysis, there
is a focus on the economic perspective. Recalling the consideration
from Section 1, Okuyama (2003) understands’‘damages’ as direct
physical destruction of means of production in a company/sector
and deﬁnes’‘direct losses’ as the output losses in the affected
company/sector due to the damages. Indirect losses are deﬁned as
the losses that other agents in the economy have, e.g., because
they are not supplied by the damaged company/sector. The total
losses (Okuyama: total impacts) are the sum of direct and indirect
losses. This deﬁnition shall serve as a starting point for the dis-
cussion of terminology and deﬁnitions.
3.1. Direct and indirect losses
Rose (2004) uses the same deﬁnition of direct and indirect
losses and emphasizes that damages should not be included in the
loss estimation. He states that for loss estimation the focus should
be on ﬂows rather than on stocks (of means of production) and
therefore damages to the stock should not be counted. Four rea-
sons are presented.
First, losses can occur without damages and therefore yield a
broader approach. Second, ignoring damages avoids double-
counting of impacts. For example, a destroyed machine could be
counted once as damage and a second time as the lost output from
not running, although the output is already partly contained in the
value of the machine in the sense of net present value of expected
(future) output. The third argument is that ﬂow measures are
more consistent with’‘indices of well-being’ such as the GDP or
income. Finally, since ﬂows refer to time periods, they are the
preferable measure for losses during the recovery phase. Stock
measures such as replacement costs for an asset are independent
of how long it is unavailable for production and therefore
inaccurate.
Hallegatte and Przyluski (2010) agree with the distinction be-
tween direct and indirect losses made by Okuyama (2003)
and Rose (2004). They point out that, in theory, damage and direct
loss are equal for market goods but, in practice, the validity
of the underlying theoretical equation chain’‘damage¼asset
loss¼replacement cost¼market value¼net present value of ex-
pected output¼output loss¼direct loss’ has to be veriﬁed, in
particular the third and fourth equation.
However, they suggest that the total direct losses should be the
sum of output losses and replacement costs. They use the term
consumption losses to capture replacement costs and output los-
ses; Replacement costs do not represent a loss of output but they
are a’‘forced investment’ which also reduces consumption. That
would contradict the strict focus on ﬂow losses proposed by Rose
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cluding both stock damage and ﬂow losses can be reasonable if
one interprets the output (ﬂow) losses as’‘opportunity costs of
delays in restoring production’.
It can be seen that even in the scientiﬁc literature, terms are not
always used consistently and concepts of impacts/losses/damages
can be slightly different. On the other hand, there seems to be a
consensus about the importance of indirect losses. Many authors
emphasize the non-linear relationship between direct and indirect
losses in the case of extreme weather events (e.g. Hallegatte, 2008;
Kowalewski and Ujeyl, 2012) and ﬁnd that the larger the damages
caused by a disaster the larger the share of indirect losses in the
total losses (direct and indirect).
3.2. Non-market effects
Direct non-market losses include all damages that cannot be
repaired or replaced through purchases on a market (Hallegatte
and Przyluski, 2010). In Rose (2004), non-market effects corre-
spond primarily to losses occurring because public goods are not
provided anymore.
This concerns mainly public infrastructure and natural re-
sources. Theoretically, these effects are included in the above loss
deﬁnition, but they are more difﬁcult to assess, because attributing
a price to public goods like, e.g., health is difﬁcult and estimates
are rarely consensual (Hallegatte and Przyluski, 2010).
The distinction between direct and indirect non-market losses
can be made analogously to the case of market losses. Further-
more, for non-market losses it seems a good idea to concentrate
on ﬂow losses because damages to the stock can hardly be accu-
rately priced. For example, if a tourist area of high symbolic value
is devastated by a storm, it is nearly impossible to quantify the
corresponding non-market losses as stocks, but the lost income in
the tourist sector can be captured more easily.
3.3. Time horizon and positive impacts
Time is an important factor regarding impacts. With the con-
cept of ﬂow losses, damages are connected to time. The common
idea when using this concept is that damages from an event all
occur at a very speciﬁc point in time and losses begin to accu-
mulate. In certain cases, also new damages can occur over the
course of the extreme weather situation. For example, some crops
might survive a 2-day ﬂood but will die in a longer one. In eco-
nomic impact modeling, however, the period when new damages
keep occurring, is still considered short (Okuyama, 2003). There-
fore the time horizon of impacts is mainly determined by the
length of the recovery and reconstruction period.
Negative losses or gains in a post-disaster situation can occur
for two reasons. First, because reconstruction yields additional
demand (stimulus effect) and second because the damaged capital
is replaced with new capital of higher productivity (productivity
effect).
The stimulating effect of reconstruction depends on the pre-
disaster condition of the economy, in particular the phase of the
business cycle. It is likely to be larger if there are idle means of
production as in a recession and it is likely to be smaller if all
means are used to the full extent as in a boom (Hallegatte and
Przyluski, 2010). Especially if an economy is hit by multiple events
in a rather short time period, all available resources might already
be fully employed for reconstruction. In this case, no positive sti-
mulus effect occurs.
The length of the reconstruction period is mainly determined
by two types of constraints, ﬁnancial and technical constraints
(Hallegatte and Przyluski, 2010). Financial resources might not be
sufﬁcient to undertake the reconstruction investment, which isbelieved to be especially important for less developed economies
(cf. Mechler et al., 2006). Technical constraints can arise because
resources needed for reconstruction (qualiﬁed workers, etc.) can-
not be supplied beyond a certain amount even if price adjustments
can partly transform this constraint into a ﬁnancial one.
Regarding the productivity effect, the importance of it is still
controversially discussed in the literature. Hallegatte and Dumas
(2008) ﬁnd that the productivity effect has an inﬂuence on the
output level and can dampen long-term losses but it does not
change the equilibrium growth path. Furthermore, they emphasize
that a negative long-term growth effect (poverty trap) can also be
relevant, especially in less developed countries. This is the case be-
cause a) many less developed countries are located in world regions
where the frequency/intensity of severe weather events is already
higher than elsewhere and b) their (ﬁnancial) resources are often
low, such that the time period between two consecutive events
might not be sufﬁcient to bring the economy/society back to the pre-
event status. In general, the timing/frequency/order of extreme
events is important for the losses. In particular, possible overlapping
events (weather or other) can be relevant for the size of losses.
3.4. Direct losses by sector and time
In the following, an attempt is made to combine the regional,
temporal and sectoral dimension of losses from extreme weather
events, focusing on European conditions. Frei and Kowalewski
(2013) have developed a climate change vulnerability index with a
regional and sectoral scope. The sensitivity (cf. Fig. 1) for different
sectors is measured by the respective water intensity, energy in-
tensity, diversity of inputs and dependence on the trafﬁc infra-
structure. The regional scale is implemented via regionalized in-
put–output tables which will be mentioned again in Section 4. The
exposition to climate change is quantiﬁed by the regional tem-
perature projections. As losses from extreme weather events are
one main outcome of vulnerability to climate change, those sec-
toral and regional vulnerability analyses can be an important tool
to understand the economics of extreme weather.
The sectoral structure chosen in this paper is in line with the
determinants of sectoral sensitivity identiﬁed by Frei and Kowa-
lewski (2013). However, the approach used here also includes
different types of extreme weather events. Therefore, the con-
siderations in this chapter cannot fully capture the sectoral, tem-
poral and regional complexity of impacts of extreme weather. The
focus is on (potential) losses which are outcomes of exposition and
sensitivity of the sectors. Table 1 is meant to indicate – in a very
abstract manner – which sector is affected to which extent by
which type of extreme event, differentiating between a shorter
and a longer time frame. For the long-term, potential gains from,
e.g., reconstruction demands are included.
In the agricultural sector, destroyed crops can be a major
source of losses of ﬂoods in the short-term. Necessary purchase of
fodder and the dependence on imports might generate additional
losses in the long run. Frequently, also the soil quality can be ne-
gatively inﬂuenced for years due to washed-in heavy metals or
other pollutive substances.
Regarding droughts, crop shortfall is a relevant short-term
consequence with corresponding long-term implications. Erosion
may become a long-term loss when rainfall hits the dried-out soil.
Heat can lead to gains in the agricultural sector due to increased
yield of some crops in some places but also create losses due to
decreased yield of other crops in other place European Environ-
ment Agency, 2012b. Cold events can increase the fodder demand
and damage plants, but long-term losses of cold events seem
negligible. Storms can destroy plants by winds and hail which can
yield signiﬁcant losses. Regarding forestry, long-term losses from
windthrow can manifest in lower wood prices.
Table 1
Potential direct impacts by sector, type of event and time frame. A minus () indicates a moderate loss, a double minus () a signiﬁcant loss, a plus (þ) indicates a gain
and a circle (o) neutral or negligible effects. Source: own representation.
Flood Drought Heat Cold Storm
Sector Short Long Short Long Short Long Short Long Short Long
Agriculture     o o  o  
Industry  þ  o  o  o  o
Tourism  o o  þ o þ o  o
Transport   o o  o    o
Energy    o  o  o  o
Insurance    o  o  o  
Housing  þ o o o o  þ  þ
Health  o o o  o  o  o
Ecosystems  o   o o o o  o
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difﬁcult to summarize. Floods can destroy production sites and
warehouses resulting in potentially big direct and indirect losses.
On the other hand, in the longer run, reconstruction activities
might create additional demand, yielding gains. Droughts might
cause production losses through lack of (cooling) water in the
short run but losses are probably small in the long run. Potential
losses from heat are lower productivity and additional cooling
costs. Long-term losses are believed to be less important. Apart
from additional heating costs, losses from cold events might reach
industries and businesses indirectly, e.g., through the transport
sector. The impact of storms is also assumed to be moderate for
European industries and businesses, good insurance coverage of
buildings being one reason for that.
Floods can lead to a decline in tourist stays in the short run.
The consequences of droughts are usually mitigated as well as
possible for the tourist sectors, but losses from water scarcity
might become larger over time. Heat waves can be positive for’‘-
refreshing’ tourist areas like mountains, forests, lakes and coasts
but also negative for cities and in general, if many tourists fear
health problems. Similar issues might be the case for cold waves.
However, tourism in the winter time is usually concentrated in a
few areas which should rather beneﬁt from cold waves and heavy
snow events. Storms might result in moderate losses in the tourist
sector in the short run but losses in the long run are not assumed
to be relevant.
Regarding the transport sector, ﬂoods can cause enormous
losses by destroying streets, bridges, railways, etc. Since re-
construction usually takes at least months, also long-term losses
are considered very signiﬁcant. Droughts as such are believed to
leave the trafﬁc system more or less unaffected. Heat can lead to
damages to the trafﬁc infrastructure but resulting losses should be
only relevant in the short run. Cold waves and snow most likely
impact the transport sector much more severely, potentially re-
sulting in complete break-downs of the trafﬁc system. Also long-
term frost damages lead to additional costs. The losses from storm
events are relevant in the short-term as they may affect all dif-
ferent transport modes, but are not assumed to be long-lasting.
The energy sector provides ‘lifeline’ services. Therefore, also
small damages which lead to power outs of a few hours can result
in signiﬁcant losses. In case of major damages, long-term losses
become relevant. Due to the afore mentioned dependence of the
European energy production on cooling water, droughts and heat
events can yield losses in the short run. Cold waves and snow
events are more likely to affect the energy grid, also potentially
causing power outs. Damages to the grid and resulting power outs
can also be caused by storms.
In the insurance sector, losses are claims by insurants. Floods
are frequently responsible for severe property damage, a part of
which is covered by insurance. Actual insurance payments, how-
ever, might be made weeks or months after the event andtherefore losses are also identiﬁed in the long run. Crop losses
from droughts are often covered by insurance. Heat or cold events
are not so relevant for the insurance sector. On the other hand,
storms in Europe belong to the costliest extreme weather events
for insurers.
The housing sector might suffer from uninsured ﬂood da-
mages to buildings in the short run, but reconstruction can have
also positive effects in the longer run. Droughts and heat waves are
assumed to have only minor effects on the housing sector. During
cold waves and strong winters, construction activity might be in-
terrupted but the resulting losses are compensated with additional
gains from catch-up construction later. The situation for storms is
similar to the ﬂood situation.
Impacts of ﬂoods on human health are believed to be mainly
physical injuries. However, the experience of major ﬂood events
can also lead to psychological trauma. Water pollution can occur
but access to clean drinking is usually ensured in Europe, even
after a ﬂood. No lethal impacts of droughts on health have been
reported (European Environment Agency, 2012a), but water
quality can be a problem in case of general water scarcity in the
long run. As mentioned before, heat waves have big impacts on
human health, resulting in hospital stays and possibly thousands
of additional deaths. Cold waves and storms can also be re-
sponsible for numerous deaths. For storms, also injuries occurring
during clearing work are important related health impacts.
Impacts of extreme weather events on ecosystems are often
overlooked. However, ﬂoods do not only damage commercial
crops but also natural organic resources. Long-term soil pollution
and recovery periods can lead to loss accumulation over time.
Droughts have a negative inﬂuence on plants and animals in most
ecosystems and can amplify erosion processes. Regarding heat and
cold waves, it is believed that ecosystems are able to cope with
them unless there is a drought at the same time. Furthermore,
storms can damage ecosystems like forests and also marine
ecosystems.
This concludes the identiﬁcation of possible impacts of extreme
weather events. It has been become clear that a sectoral categor-
ization of impacts is useful. The temporal dimension was ad-
dressed only brieﬂy here, but a combined sectoral and temporal
analysis can help to understand the development in the aftermath
of an extreme event. Capturing all the different impacts in one
framework or model is impossible. Therefore several modeling
techniques are available to estimate the economic impacts, all of
which have certain pros and cons. These are discussed in the fol-
lowing section.4. Modeling approaches for economic impact assessment
First, it has to be stressed why models are needed at all for
impact assessment. The reason is that simply listing tangible asset
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of the total losses and because of their complexity, they cannot be
easily captured by surveys or lists of damages. This complexity is
reduced with the help of models, the most prominent of which are
discussed in this paper.
In general, modeling techniques for economic impact assess-
ment can be described as either’‘retrospective’ or’‘prospective’
(Rose, 2004). That means that some models are more useful to
analyze events that actually happened (retrospective) and others
are more useful to simulate possible events (prospective). Retro-
spective models work with economic data about the time after a
disaster and try to identify the impacts caused by the disaster.
Prospective models describe the’‘normal’ economic situation and
then use data about disasters to simulate the consequences of
hypothetical events. Whereas general economic data (output,
employment, etc.) is usually available with a decent degree of
accuracy, data about a disaster or extreme weather event such as
damages, losses, etc. is sometimes inaccurate and unclear re-
garding the methodology by which it was obtained (Rose, 2004).
The quality of data required also depends on the purpose and
therefore the desired accuracy of the model. For damage mitiga-
tion or adaptation to extreme weather events, a higher accuracy is
needed than for general assessment of severity of certain events.
To investigate optimal allocation in immediate post-disaster si-
tuation, even more accurate models are needed (Rose, 2004).
Another issue in this paper is the geographical scope. By their
nature, extreme weather events are usually local phenomena and
therefore it is highly desirable to use small-scale economic models
for assessment of impacts. Additionally, a focus on cities implies
even more challenges, especially regarding data. However, the
economy of European cities can only be accurately modeled by
considering also their surrounding area which means that regional
models are suitable, possibly requiring some speciﬁcation. A sec-
toral dimension is important, too, as it serves to explain how direct
losses propagate through the economy.
For the following overview, three main types of impact models
that are commonly used and discussed by economists are treated
(cf. Okuyama, 2003; Hallegatte and Przyluski, 2010; Rose, 2004).
4.1. Econometric models
Econometric models are frequently used as retrospective
models to understand actual events. They were used, e.g., by
Guimaraes et al. (1993) to compute possible impacts of hurricane
Hugo which hit South Carolina in 1989 or by Berlemann and Vogt
(2007) to calculate impacts of the 2002 Elbe ﬂood in Saxony,
Germany. The econometric approach is based on forecasting
techniques that were applied to pre-disaster economic variables.
The forecast values are then compared to the actual observed post-
disaster values. It is crucial to include post-disaster national vari-
ables or other general indicators in the forecast to obtain mean-
ingful results. Otherwise, processes like a nationwide recession
could be falsely attributed to the extreme event. There-
fore, Guimaraes et al. (1993) emphasize the importance to really
compare the situations’‘with’ and’‘without’ the event instead of’‘-
before’ and ‘after’.
Regarding the regional scope, key data like employment and
output for different sectors are usually available also on a regional
scale. Therefore, the data requirements are considered manageable
although the amounts can be big when many variables are con-
sidered at many points in time. Rose (2004) considers data re-
quirements as a problem but over the last years data availability
has increased at least for Europe. The sectoral dimension is not
explicitly contained in the model, but time series about the activity
of important economic sectors allow for sectoral impact analysis.
The temporal dimension is of course explicitly included.Advantages of econometric models are that the effect of an
extreme weather event on any regional variable with a decent
time series can be computed without having to know the precise
impact channels. In addition, the development of impacts over
time can be captured easily. The models can also help to study the
still controversially discussed issue of whether disasters or ex-
treme weather events lead to economic growth. Furthermore, the
estimates for the change in economic variables obtained by the
model can be used for simulation and calibration of other models.
A disadvantage is the lack of impact theory, as it is, e.g., difﬁcult to
distinguish between direct and indirect losses (Rose, 2004) and to
understand in which way losses in different sectors depend on
each other.
4.2. Input–output models
The second important model class is the class of input–output
(I–O) models. The cores of those models are input–output tables
which represent the interdependence of different sectors of the
(regional) economy. In the simplest version, the I–O coefﬁcients
are assumed to be ﬁxed which corresponds to the assumption of
Leontief production functions in the sectors. Further properties of
I–O models are that, because prices are ﬁxed, possible supply
bottlenecks in case of a shock lead to rationing behavior which has
to be speciﬁed exogenously.
One reason for the popularity of those models is their simpli-
city (Okuyama, 2003) and their easy linear structure. Over the last
decades, also more sophisticated versions of input–output models
have been derived that include price reactions (Hallegatte, 2008)
or stocks of inventory of intermediate goods in the production
processes (Hallegatte, 2012). Regarding data input on a regional
scale, methods have been derived to regionalize input–output
tables (Flegg and Webber, 1997) and thus, regional I–O models can
be constructed.
The sectoral dimension of impacts is, by deﬁnition, compre-
hensively captured by I–O models. Advantages of I–O models are
that reconstruction dynamics after a disaster seem to be replicated
quite well, at least by speciﬁc I–O models (Hallegatte, 2008). There
is an easy, clear theory about how impacts propagate through the
economy and the concept of direct and indirect losses is im-
plemented on a sectoral level. Disadvantages are that price reac-
tions are often ignored and therefore some medium-term impacts
are not captured. Generally, there is a lack of behavioral content
(Rose and Liao, 2005). Long-term impacts are also difﬁcult to as-
sess and at least some support from other model classes (econo-
metric models, growth models) is needed. Many authors (Okuya-
ma, 2003; Hallegatte and Przyluski, 2010) ﬁnd that I–O models are
likely to overestimate indirect losses from disasters because inputs
are assumed not to be substitutable.
4.3. CGE models
General equilibrium analysis in the context of economic im-
pacts of disasters was used, e.g., by Shibusawa and Miyata (2011)
to assess possible impacts of an earthquake or by Rose and Liao
(2005) to analyze economic impacts of regional water service
disruptions. CGE models consist of equations of supply and de-
mand functions which are simultaneously solved to obtain equi-
librium factor allocation and prices. One way to look at it is that
ﬂows of the I–O table are split into a quantity component and a
price component (West, 1995), both of which are determined by
respective equations. As usual for the CGE model class, the pro-
duction functions of the economic sectors are of the Cobb–Douglas
type, or more general, the CES type. Thus, factor inputs are at least
partly substitutable, resulting in price-dependent I–O coefﬁcients.
Because of the assumed ﬂexibility in the production function, CGE
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disaster impact analysis. First, because an adaptation of the pro-
duction process towards a different mix of inputs might be difﬁcult
to realize in a disaster situation and second, because an adjust-
ment of the production process through prices seems unlikely in
the aftermath of a disaster (Hallegatte, 2012). However, Hallegatte
and Przyluski (2010) ﬁnd that modeling input scarcity through can
still be reasonable.
Since part of the impact of price changes can be avoided by
substitution, CGE analysis generally leads to lower estimated
economic losses compared to I–O analysis (Okuyama, 2003).
An advantage of CGE models is their ﬂexibility; supply and
demand function can basically take any form. Also, many dynamic
CGE models allow to capture medium-term and long-term impacts
of disasters. Another advantage is that CGE models often work
with a certain overall welfare concept arising from utility func-
tions of households. This implies that basically all indirect and
higher-order losses can be captured. For example, if transportation
is modeled and commuting times increase due to an extreme
weather event, this reduces leisure time which yields a loss of
welfare. The welfare concept makes it possible to analyze social
and distributional impacts as well as (changing) decisions of
households (consumption, labor supply, etc.). Finally, it can help to
assess overall social costs and beneﬁts of adaptation strategies to
climate change or to extreme weather events in particular.
Disadvantages can be big set of parameters that need to be
calibrated which is especially a problem on a regional level where
decent data is not always available. Furthermore, impacts might be
underestimated as, in contrast to I–O models, some impacts are
assumed being avoidable by substitution behavior. Because of the
fact that CGE models always assume an optimization behavior and
thus, equilibrated market situations, some temporary disequilibria
arising from supply bottlenecks or overshooting reconstruction
cannot be suitably handled.5. Conclusion
In the previous sections, an overview about terminology in
extreme weather impact analysis was given, types of extreme
weather events affecting European regions and in particular cities
were collected, addressing their potential sectoral impacts. Section
3 reviewed common approaches to structure the impacts and in
Section 4, relevant economic impacts models were discussed. This
conclusive section attempts to bring everything together, give
advice regarding which model is most useful to cover which im-
pacts and formulate existing difﬁculties and future research
questions.
5.1. Limits in modeling
In Sections 2 and 3, different potential impacts of extreme
weather events on cities were listed. As mentioned earlier, models
try to reduce the complexity of impacts, thereby trying to capture
the most relevant. Therefore, the ability of the three presented
model types to deal with certain impacts is discussed in the
following.
Econometric models are able to model a variety of impacts, as
long as a decent time series is available. Since local/regional vari-
ables are of interest, this might reduce the applicability a bit, but
information about output, value added, income, employment and
public expenditures/deﬁcits are often available on a regional level.
On the other hand, behavioral changes of households, psycholo-
gical effects, etc. belong to those impacts which are not so well
covered by time series data. Regarding sectoral impact assessment,
there is the advantage that also non-market or very speciﬁcsectors can be considered. Another important issue is the avail-
ability of national or other higher aggregated variables to construct
a baseline scenario. For core economic data mentioned above, this
is no problem, but for more speciﬁc data it might be.
Input–output models are most useful to analyze the impacts on
the production chains and the resulting losses. Impacts on the
ecosystem, other non-market impacts and behavioral changes are
more difﬁcult to cover since the model capabilities depend, among
other things, on the sectoral classiﬁcation made in the underlying
input–output table. A special strength of I–O models seems to be
the modeling of the reconstruction period after a disaster because
ﬁnal demand can be exogenously speciﬁed. Concerning the re-
gional scale, several models have been developed, such as the
adaptive regional input–output model (ARIO) (Hallegatte, 2008) or
the economic module of the HAZUS model (cf. Rose, 2004).
CGE models are often constructed top-down with an input–
output table or a social accounting matrix, so impacts on the
production chain can also be well covered. In contrast to I–O
models, a government sector which collects taxes and redis-
tributes income is frequently included in CGE models. Households
play a key role, and instead of a top-down approach, a model can
also be constructed bottom-up from household expenditures.
Their decisions are usually modeled with the help of a utility
function. This allows for behavioral and welfare analysis, and de-
pending on the detailedness, also distributional and social impact
analysis. What CGE models can not cover so well are very short-
term impacts where optimal choices and equilibrated markets are
not present. CGE models haven been used for disaster impact
analysis, but rather on a national scale (Shibusawa and Miyata,
2011; Ueda and Koike, 2000) than on a regional scale (Rose and
Liao, 2005). There are also urban CGE models, for example the
regional economy land use and transportation model (RELUTRAN)
(Anas and Liu, 2007). This model has been primarily used for
policy analysis, but recently also for the economic assessment of
ﬂood risk changes (Jahn, 2014).
5.2. Further research issues
There are still many unanswered questions in the ﬁeld of im-
pact modeling of extreme weather events. For example, the trade-
off between complexity and applicability seems to be an important
issue. In the I–O and CGE branch, many different speciﬁcations of
models exist and a further comparison of the accuracy of their loss
estimates has to be made to ﬁnd out which model features are
essential.
Also, the cooperation between natural scientists and econo-
mists has to be further intensiﬁed. A combined knowledge about
extreme weather as such and loss estimation is needed to develop
successful loss mitigation strategies. As more precise climate
projections become available, that allow, e.g., for seasonal and sub-
seasonal forecasts of extreme events, the scale of economic models
should be adapted correspondingly. Policy makers and the public
are further actors who have to be provided with simple yet ac-
curate information by natural scientists and economists to im-
plement adaptation/loss mitigation strategies.References
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